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Summary
It has been established by the Schumacker doctrine that the personal and family
circumstances of a taxpayer must be taken into account in at least one Member
State. Normally the residence state has the obligation to take into account the per-
sonal and family circumstances, since that state is in the best position to examine
the taxpayer’s ability to pay. However, the problem arises when a taxpayer works
in two or several Member States, that he usually loses the proportion of personal
tax benefits that are attributable to the foreign income. In case all or almost all of
his income is received in the source state, he is comparable to a resident and must
be granted personal tax benefits. However, in case he only earns part of his income
in the source state, it must be examined whether his situation is comparable to
that of a resident. It is not clear in which situations the Schumacher doctrine
applies.
This thesis is a study of the scope of the Schumacker doctrine. The paper analyses
which rules rules that take into account the ability to pay and in which situations
a taxpayer is considered to be comparable to that of a non-resident. The findings
of the study are that such rules are difficult to identify, since there are considerable
differences between countries and the aim of the rules vary. However, rules that
take into account the ability to pay generally weighs unspecified on a taxpayers
total income.
It is not possible to set a general threshold for determining the proportion of
income that has to be earned in the source state state in order for the non-resident
to be considered comparable to a resident. The reason is that the treatment in the
source state is dependent on whether the income in the residence state is sufficient
for that state to take into account the personal and family circumstances of the
taxpayer. It may be the case that the taxpayer earns equal amounts of income in
the source and the residence state, but the amount earned in the residence state is
not taxable there. In such case it is only the source state that has the possibility to
take into account personal and family circumstances of the taxpayer. They must
be taken into account once somewhere.
4
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
“It is unfair to treat unequally equal persons and equally unequal persons”1. This
is a principle originating from the Greek philosopher Aristotle from which the non
discrimination article2, in TFEU stems.3
Ability to pay is a fundamental concept in taxation.4 When the ability to pay is
taken into account, the taxpayer will contribute to the society in accordance with
his consumption power which is determined by his overall income and costs. Since
the overall income includes both domestic and foreign income, the residence state
is normally in the best position to asses the ability to pay. The progressiveness of
taxation is one of the features of the principle, the granting of personal deductions
is another, both of which can easily be performed in a situation when only one
country is involved. However, difficulties arise when taxing rights are allocated
between two or more countries.5
Generally ability to pay plays an important role globally when it comes to forming
tax policies. In some countries it can be found in the constitution.6 Even though
globally accepted, it is a principle established in domestic law7 and there is no
reference to the ability to pay in the EU treaties. Nevertheless, the ECJ has in
cases concerning the fundamental freedoms enforced national rules that take into
account the ability to pay in cross-border situations.8
When different rules are applied to nationals of different EU Member States, re-
sulting in that one of them is worse off, it is considered to be discriminatory only
insofar they are in a comparable situation. The ECJ has established that, as a
general rule, residents and non-residents are not comparable for direct tax pur-
1Marco Greggi, “Revisiting “Schumacker”: The Role of Limited Tax Liability in EU Law”, Al-
locating Taxing Powers within the European Union (Springer, 2013) p.43, referring to Artis-
totle’s Ethic to Nicomaco, V, 5. (used version: Natali, “Nicomachean ethics: Symposium
aristotelicum”, Oxford (2009)).
2Aricle 18, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union C 326 (2012):
1–390.
3Marco Greggi, “Revisiting “Schumacker”: The Role of Limited Tax Liability in EU Law”,
Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union (Springer, 2013) pp. 43-44.
4Frans Vanistendael, “Ability to Pay in European Community Law”, EC Tax Review 23.3
(2014): p 154.
5Wolfgang Scho¨n, “International tax coordination for a second-best world (part I)”, World Tax
Journal 1.1 (2009): pp. 71-72.
6Wolfgang Scho¨n, “International tax coordination for a second-best world (part I)”, World Tax
Journal 1.1 (2009): p 72.
7Wolfgang Scho¨n, “International tax coordination for a second-best world (part I)”, World Tax
Journal 1.1 (2009): p 72.
8Frans Vanistendael, “Ability to Pay in European Community Law”, EC Tax Review 23.3
(2014): p. 122.
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poses,9 and different treatment on the basis of residence is the norm.10 The reason
for it is that non residents usually derive only part of their income in the source
state. However, the situation is different in cases when the taxpayer derives all,
or almost all of his income in the source state; in this case the non resident is in a
comparable situation to a resident.11
While most states grant personal tax relief for resident tax payers, non-residents
are normally not entitled to such deductions or reductions in the source state.12
When a taxpayer earns part of his income in the residence state, he is normally
only entitled to a proportionate part of personal deductions in this state. However,
according to the tax legislation the source state, he is normally not entitled to part
of personal deductions there.13 Thus, what was established in the Schumacker 14
case does not solve the situations when the taxpayer does not earn all or almost
all of his income in the source state.
One possible solution for avoiding discrimination could be to grant the taxpayer
an option to be taxed as a non-resident with a flat tax rate, or as a resident
with a progressive tax rate and with the right to make personal deductions, as
the possibility is in Sweden. There is currently a pending ECJ case, Hirvonen, in
which the question referred to the ECJ is whether such provisions are contrary to
the free movement of workers.15
A number of cases have followed the Schumacker case and extended taxpayers
rights to have their ability to pay taken into account. However, it is not clear under
which circumstances the Schumacker doctrine applies as making the distinction
between rules taking personal and family circumstances into account and other
rules is difficult.16 There is furthermore a lack of clear benchmarks for assessing
discrimination.17 Case law has recently developed as regards the circumstances
that must be at hand18 and the scope of the Shumacker doctrine needs further
clarification.
9C-279/93 Finanzamt Ko¨ln-Altstadt v. Schumacker [1995] paras. 30-31.
10Richard Lyal, “Non-discrimination and direct tax in Community law”, EC Tax Review 12.2
(2003): p 68.
11Richard Lyal, “Non-discrimination and direct tax in Community law”, EC Tax Review 12.2
(2003): p. 72.
12Kees van Raad, “Non-Residents - Personal Allowances, Deduction of Personal Expenses and
Tax Rates”, Journals IBFD vt.2 (2010): p. 155.
13Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
217 (2000): p 210.
14C-279/93 Finanzamt Ko¨ln-Altstadt v. Schumacker [1995] paras. 36-38.
15C-632/13 Skatteverket v Hilkka Hirvonen [].
16Michael Lang, “Recent Case Law of the ECJ in Direct Taxation: Trends, Tensions and Con-
tradictions”, EC tax review 3.2009 (2009): p 101-102.
17Marco Greggi, “Revisiting “Schumacker”: The Role of Limited Tax Liability in EU Law”,
Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union (Springer, 2013) p 47.
18C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012];, C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finan-
zamt Velbert [2013];, C-425/11 Katja Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz [2013];, C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge [2013].
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1.2 Aim
The aim with this thesis is to clarify the scope of the Schumacker doctrine and
specifically to answer the questions “Which tax rules are considered to take into
account the ability to pay?” and “What are the thresholds for determining when
a non-resident is in a comparable situation to that of a resident?”.
An article by Fans Vanistendael has recently been published, Ability to Pay in
European Community Law 19 where the author analyses the way in which the ability
to pay principle is applied in cross-border situations. Vanistendael’s article however
does not include an analysis of the most recent judgments in the field, Commission
v Estonia20, Ettwein21, Welte22 and Imfeld23. The author of this thesis is not
aware of any other work that has thoroughly altogether analysed the recent cases
mentioned. Therefore, the contribution of this thesis will be to analyse the scope
of the ability to pay in ECJ case law as regards the most recent cases.
1.3 Method and material
For the purpose of this thesis, the traditional legal method is used, which in the
EU context is founded on principles of interpretation where rules to a large extent
are interpreted in the light of their objective.24 Since the aim of the thesis is to
analyse the law as it stands today, de lege lata, the traditional legal method is the
only one that can fulfil this purpose.
As stated in section 1.1 there is no reference to the principle of ability to pay in the
EU treaties. The law as it stands today follows from the judgments of the ECJ,
which consequently constitute the most important material, accompanied by the
ancillary, but important, Opinions of the Advocate Generals. While the judgments
rarely makes references to legal doctrine, such references are often found in the
AG’s Opinions.25Article 252 of the TFEU requires the Advocate General to act
independently and to make reasoned submissions on cases. Independence can be
understood in more than one aspect; independence from political interference and
independence from previous judgments of the ECJ are two of them. Further, the
opinions are not subject to negotiation or amendments.26
19Frans Vanistendael, “Ability to Pay in European Community Law”, EC Tax Review 23.3
(2014): 121–134.
20C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012].
21C-425/11 Katja Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz [2013].
22C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013].
23C-303/12 Guido Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge [2013].
24Jo¨rgen Hettne and Ida Otken Eriksson, EU-ra¨ttslig metod: teori och genomslag i svensk
ra¨ttstilla¨mpning (Norstedts juridik, 2011) p. 36.
25Bernitz Ulf et al., Finna ra¨tt–juristens ka¨llmaterial och arbetsmetoder (Norstedts Juridik AB,
2012) p. 72.
26Iyiola Solanke, “Diversity and Independence in the European Court of Justice”, Colum. J.
Eur. L. 15 (2008): p. 98-101.
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The opinion of the Advocate General is in most cases followed. Even when the
ECJ does not follow the opinion, it can be used to influence future case law.27
The analysis of and opinions on case law in doctrinal articles are also important
material that this thesis is built upon.
1.4 Delimitation
This thesis only concerns direct taxation of individuals. The prohibition of dif-
ferent treatment of taxpayers in objectively same situations is also applicable for
companies28 but company taxation and its implications on the fundamental free-
doms is beyond the scope of this thesis. Since the subject has been extensively
analysed, the thesis is focused on recent case law that has not yet been subject
to thorough doctrinal analysis. Further, it is not the aim of this thesis to anal-
yse which double tax credit rule that would be the most suitable for solving the
problems in a Schumacker situation. However, for a better understanding of the
problem, the methods and their consequences will shortly be presented.
Taxes that, according to Vanistendael, can take the taxpayers ability to pay into
account is income-, wealth-, inheritance- and gift taxes.29 Most of the cases found
relating to the ability to pay concerns income tax, but Welte30 is a case concerning
inheritance tax. The choice of cases includes all types of tax features that has been
identified as related to the ability to pay.31. The first category of cases concerns
personal deductions and family circumstances, Schumacker 32, Wielockx 33, Gilly34,
Gschwind35, Zurstrassen36, Wallentin37, Lakebrink 38, Commission v Estonia39,
Ettwein40 and Imfeld41. One case fits in both the second category concerning
the progressiveness of tax rates and the third category concerning deduction of
27Iyiola Solanke, “Diversity and Independence in the European Court of Justice”, Colum. J.
Eur. L. 15 (2008): p. 102-103.
28See for example Case 270/83 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic
[1986].
29Frans Vanistendael, “Ability to Pay in European Community Law”, EC Tax Review 23.3
(2014): p 121.
30C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013].
31Frans Vanistendael has identified five tax features relating to the ability to pay, see Frans
Vanistendael, “Ability to Pay in European Community Law”, EC Tax Review 23.3 (2014): p
122.
32C-279/93 Finanzamt Ko¨ln-Altstadt v. Schumacker [1995].
33C-80/94 G. H. E. J. Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen [1995].
34C-336/96 Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin [1998].
35C-391/97 Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt [1999].
36C-87/99 Patrick Zurstrassen v Administration des contributions directes [2000].
37C-169/03 Florian W. Wallentin v Riksskatteverket [2004].
38C-182/06 E´tat du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Hans Ulrich Lakebrink and Katrin Peters-
Lakebrink [2007].
39C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012].
40C-425/11 Katja Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz [2013].
41C-303/12 Guido Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge [2013].
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business expenses, Gerritse42.The fourth category concerning the structure of the
tax scale includes the Asscher 43 case. The fifth category concerns deductions of
losses and includes Lakebrink 44. The case law referred to in this thesis consists of
judgments available at the 30th of March 2014.
1.5 Outline
An explanation of the concepts of discrimination and comparability will first be
provided. In order to understand how problems arise regarding tax rules taking
into account the taxpayer’s ability to pay when he derives income from other states
than the residence state, a presentation methods for eliminating double taxation
follows. Then a presentation of the Shumacker case and related doctrine follows.
Thereafter, the resent case law will be analysed, taking into account the historical
application of the Schumacker doctrine and its objective. In the conclusion the
benchmarks and the tax rules that take into account the ability to pay, that has
been derived from the recent lase law, will be presented and serve as clarifications
of the scope of the Schumacker doctrine.
2 Tax discrimination and comparability
In this section two concepts that are directly linked to each other will be presented.
An explanation of the concepts tax discrimination and comparability, on which tax
discrimination is dependent on, will be provided.
2.1 Tax Discrimination
Although direct taxation falls within the exclusive competence of the Member
States, they must exercise their powers in consistence with EU law.45 The ECJ
has, on the basis of the fundamental freedoms and the freedom of establishment
granted by the TFEU, stated that tax discrimination on the basis of nationality is
prohibited.46 Since there is no definition of discrimination in the Treaty, the ECJ
has formed an approach of it’s own mainly in the Schumacker case and following
case law.47 Discrimination in this context can arise when different rules applies
42C-234/01 Arnoud Gerritse v Finanzamt Neuko¨lln-Nord [2003].
43C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [1996].
44C-182/06 E´tat du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Hans Ulrich Lakebrink and Katrin Peters-
Lakebrink [2007].
45See for example Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225 para. 21.
46Ruth Mason and Michael S Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination”, Yale LJ 121 (2011): p.
1025.
47Marco Greggi, “Revisiting “Schumacker”: The Role of Limited Tax Liability in EU Law”,
Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union (Springer, 2013) p. 46.
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to nationals of different Member States in an objectively comparable situation,
resulting in that one of them is placed in a less favourable situation.48
Source taxation49 generally differs from residence taxation50 in that source taxation
is levied on the gross income at a flat tax rate, whereas residence taxation is
levied on the net income progressively. The gross taxation of non residents can be
motivated by the aim to reduce the burden of filing a complete tax return in the
source state. Further, the imposition of a flat tax rate on the income in the source
state can be motivated with the fact that it is only applied on a fraction of the
total income; the taxpayer would with a progressive taxation gain an unfair tax
advantage.51
Personal tax benefits related to the civil status of the tax payer, such as the
opportunity to file a joint tax return for couples or receiving a personal allowance,
take into account the taxpayer’s ability to pay.52 Such benefits and personal tax
reliefs, for example deduction of social welfare costs or costs for home mortgage
and childcare, are often not granted to non-residents.53
2.2 Comparability
One argument for different treatment of non residents is the lack of information
about the taxpayer in the source country.54 Another argument is that it is the
responsibility of the residence state to take into account the tax payer’s ability
to pay. If the source state would also grant personal tax benefits, the tax payer
could end up with double benefits.55 However, when a tax payer derives most of
his income from the source state, and the income is exempt in the residence state,
the problem arises that he is unable to benefit fully from the personal tax benefits
available in that state. Therefore, since the Schumacker judgment, non-residents
deriving at least 90% of their total income form the source state must be treated
as residents in respect of personal tax benefits.
Personal tax benefits are in many countries attributed to the proportion of the
worldwide income earned by the resident taxpayer. In such situation, the tax
treatment of a cross-border is neutral only if the source state(s) provide(s) per-
48Marjaana Helminen, EU tax law: direct taxation (IBFD, 2012) sec. 2.1.2.
49Taxation in the state from where the income derives.
50Taxation in the state where the taxpayer resides.
51Ruth Mason and Michael S Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination”, Yale LJ 121 (2011): p.
1025-1027.
52Kees van Raad, “Non-Residents - Personal Allowances, Deduction of Personal Expenses and
Tax Rates”, Journals IBFD vt.2 (2010): p. 155.
53Ruth Mason and Michael S Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination”, Yale LJ 121 (2011): p.
1028.
54Ruth Mason and Michael S Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination”, Yale LJ 121 (2011): p.
1028.
55Ruth Mason and Michael S Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination”, Yale LJ 121 (2011): 1104.
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sonal tax benefits to the other proportion of the income.56 The problem with the
proportional personal tax benefits, as has been pointed out by Wattel, is that they
are usually only available for resident tax payers. Following the Shumacker doc-
trine, the source state only has to make available personal tax benefits in case the
tax payer earns all or almost all of her income in that state.57 This solution has not
been sufficient; if the tax payer derived less than 90% of the his total income from
the source state, only the residence state is obliged to grant personal tax reliefs,
and in this case not more than for the fraction of income earned in the residence
state.58 However, in case the taxpayer earns income from several states, and none
of them take personal and family circumstances into account, the residence state
cannot be free from this obligation. In such case, the residence state cannot apply
exemption with progression and apportionment for personal deductions without
without failing to fulfil its obligations in the Treaty.59
2.3 Summary
As has presented, there are a variety of reasons for applying different tax rules
to non-resident taxpayers. However, in cases where the non-resident taxpayer is
in a situation objectively comparable to that of a non-resident, and is treated
differently, discrimination arises, as established in the Schumacker case. That
judgment does not however solve the cases where the taxpayer earns only part of his
income in one or several source states. As the effect of such discrimination depends
on the method applied for the elimination of juridical double taxation60, it is
appropriate to shortly present the different methods in the following section.
3 Methods for elimination of double taxation -
consequences and solutions
Juridical double taxation arises when the source stated taxes the person accord-
ing to the source principle and the state where the person is resident taxes her
according to the residence principle simultaneously. In order to eliminate dou-
ble taxation, the residence state uses either the exemption method or the credit
56Kees van Raad, “Non-Residents - Personal Allowances, Deduction of Personal Expenses and
Tax Rates”, Journals IBFD vt.2 (2010): p. 157-158.
57Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
217 (2000): p. 210.
58Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
217 (2000): p. 217.
59C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002] paras. 100-102,116.
60Nils Mattsson, “Does the European Court of Justice Understand the Policy behind Tax benefits
Based on Personal and Family circumstances?”, European Taxation-Amsterdam- 43.6 (2003):
p. 186.
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method.61
3.1 Credit and Exemption
With full exemption, the residence state does not tax the income from the source
state. If exemption with progression is used, the residence state takes into account
the foreign income for determining the tax rate, but does not tax the income.
Alternatively, the residence state taxes the worldwide income, but deducts the
foreign paid tax.62
When using ordinary credit, the deductible tax in the residence country is the
lowest amount of the tax paid in the source country and the tax calculated in the
residence state. The ordinary credit method allows the deduction of the foreign
paid tax from the tax calculated on the worldwide income.63.
3.2 Consequences and solutions
The problem for a person in a Schumacker situation arises when the residence
state disregards the foreign income. As Wattel observes, a cross-border worker
usually loses the same proportion of personal allowances in the residence state as
the proportion of foreign income he earns. Wattels opinion is that non-residents,
at least in the situation described, do not differ from residents to the extent that
the host state should not grant proportional allowances. As the non-resident has
a progression benefit, he argues that this should be removed and proportional tax
benefits be granted.64
In Wattels opinion, the purpose of personal allowances is to take into account
a taxpayer’s personal ability-to-pay and they are not linked to specific items of
income.65 Furthermore, he states that personal tax advantages should be propor-
tionally divided between the countries that have taxing powers.66
61Nils Mattsson, “Does the European Court of Justice Understand the Policy behind Tax benefits
Based on Personal and Family circumstances?”, European Taxation-Amsterdam- 43.6 (2003):
p. 186.
62Nils Mattsson, “Does the European Court of Justice Understand the Policy behind Tax benefits
Based on Personal and Family circumstances?”, European Taxation-Amsterdam- 43.6 (2003):
p. 186.
63Nils Mattsson, “Does the European Court of Justice Understand the Policy behind Tax benefits
Based on Personal and Family circumstances?”, European Taxation-Amsterdam- 43.6 (2003):
p. 186.
64Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
217 (2000): p. 214.
65Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
217 (2000): p. 214.
66Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
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In order to remove the progression advantage and the allowance disadvantage,
Wattel suggests worldwide taxation of non-residents. Thus, non-residents should
be taxed as if they were residents and be granted exemption with progression
taxation relief and a proportionate share of allowances. Further, the residence
state should grant proportionate personal allowances when calculating the double
taxation relief.67
Avery Jones agrees with Watell on that the host state should grant a proportionate
share of personal allowances. However, he believes the problem of losing part of of
the personal allowances in the residence state when working in another state can
be removed with the tax credit system. Avery Jones suggest that the residence
taxes the worldwide income and grants the personal allowances before calculating
the tax credit on the foreign income.68
Furthermore, Avery Jones suggest that the credit for the foreign tax paid should
be available against the highest tax rate in the residence state, in order to minimise
the risk of a credit that does not cover the tax paid, in case the residence state has
a lower tax than the host state. He also believes that this risk is reduced when
the taxpayer is not taxed progressively in the host state.69
3.3 Summary
In this section different methods for eliminating double taxation and their conse-
quences in relation to personal allowances for persons deriving income from several
countries has been presented. The presentation is important for the understand-
ing of how the problem with loss of personal allowances and deductions is created.
The aim with this thesis is to clarify the scope of the Schumacker doctrine. Thus,
it is outside of the scope of this thesis to further investigate whether source or
worldwide taxation of non-residents is the best solution and which double taxa-
tion credit method is the most suitable one. In section 4 the Schumacker doctrine
and its development in case law is presented.
217 (2000): 214-215.
67Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
217 (2000): p. 227-228.
68JF Avery Jones, “”A Comment on Progressive Taxation of Non-residents and Intra-EC Allo-
cation of Personal Tax Allowances””, European Taxation-Amsterdam 40.8 (2000): p. 375.
69JF Avery Jones, “”A Comment on Progressive Taxation of Non-residents and Intra-EC Allo-
cation of Personal Tax Allowances””, European Taxation-Amsterdam 40.8 (2000): p. 375.
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4 The Schumacker doctrine
4.1 C-279/93 Schumacker
The Schumacker case70 from 1995 is a landmark case in which the ECJ established
the “once somewhere” principle.71 Mr. Schumacker who lived in Belgium was
subject to limited taxation in Germany where he worked. Due to the principle
applied by the German tax law, that the personal and subjective situation was to
be taken into account by the residence state, Schumacker was denied the benefit of
the splitting tariff available for married couples. Such taxation would mitigate the
progressive effect of the tax rates by aggregating the income of the spouses and tax
each of them on 50% of that income. Also other personal tax benefits were denied
or reduced for Mr. Schumacker because he was a non-resident in Germany.72
In the proceedings that Mr. Schumacker had brought against the tax authorities,
the court referred to the ECJ and brought the question whether rules applying a
higher tax rate on non resident workers in Germany, who were in a comparable
situation to resident workers except for their residence, violated the principle of
free movement of workers. The question was also what impact it might have that
the non-resident derived all or almost all of his income in Germany.73
AG Le´ger concluded that even though direct taxation is not harmonised and falls
in the exclusive competence of the member states, the Community must establish
an internal market in which all obstacles to the free movement of goods, services,
persons and capital must be abolished. AG Le´ger also referred to previous case
law in which the ECJ had held that “The principle of equal treatment with re-
gard to remuneration would be rendered ineffective if it could be undermined by
discriminatory national provisions on income tax”74. Further, AG Le´ger held that
there is a logic behind the distinction between residents and non residents: the
choice of residence is also a choice of in which state the taxpayer will contribute
to the public administration costs, and that state will provide the personal tax
benefits.75
The reason for drawing a distinction between resident and non-resident taxpayers
is that they are not objectively in the same situation; AG Le´ger cited previous
case law and stated “As we know, ’discrimination consists solely in the application
of different rules to comparable situations or in the application of the same rule to
70C-279/93 Finanzamt Ko¨ln-Altstadt v. Schumacker [1995].
71Ruth Mason and Michael S Knoll, “What is Tax Discrimination”, Yale LJ 121 (2011): p.
1031.
72Opinion of mr Advocate General Le´ger delivered on 22 November 1994 in Case C-279/93
Schumacker paras.1-7.
73Opinion of mr Advocate General Le´ger delivered on 22 November 1994 in Case C-279/93
Schumacker para. 14.
74Opinion of mr Advocate General Le´ger delivered on 22 November 1994 in Case C-279/93
Schumacker para 29.
75Opinion of Mr Advocate General Le´ger delivered on 22 November 1994 in Case C-279/93
Schumacker paras. 19-21; 36.
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differing situations’ ‘76. When a national of a Member State exercises his right to
free movement while residing in another state than the state from where he derive
all his income and pay taxes, he is discriminated if his personal circumstances and
family responsibilities are not taken into account there.77
One possible solution for determining to place a non resident on the same foot-
ing as a resident, is to do so if he does not derive sufficient income in his state
residence to benefit from the personal tax benefits available there. As regards the
splitting regime, which in the Schumacker case was available for couples residing
simultaneously in Belgium and Germany, there would be no justification for deny-
ing a non resident in Schumaker’s situation this benefit, even when the income of
the spouse was not taxable in Germany.78 The judgment of the ECJ was in line
with the AG’s opinion.
Before proceeding to discuss the Schumacker doctrine as applied today, it seems
appropriate to shortly present case law that have followed until Commission v
Estonia. As will be shown in Section 2.4, the Schumacker doctrine has been
extended.
4.2 Evolution of the Schumacker Doctrine in the ECJ Case
Law
In this section, case law following the Schumacker judgment is shortly presented.
That case law has already been extensively analysed.79 As will be shown, a vari-
ety of tax rules can be referred to such rules that aim to take into account the
taxpayer’s ability to pay.
4.2.1 C-80/94 Wielockx - Deduction of Pension Reserves
In August the same year as the Shumacker case had been delivered, the ECJ gave
its judgment in Case C-80/94 Wielockx. Mr Wielockx, resident in Belgium, was
self-employed and derived all his income in the Netherlands. Unlike national tax-
payers, Wielockx was only taxed on his national taxable income and was refused
to deduct payments to pension reserves. The ECJ stated that a non-resident re-
ceiving all or almost all of his income in the source state is objectively comparable
to a resident of that state. In such situation, where only the non-resident tax-
payer is refused to deduct pension payments, he suffers discrimination. Since the
76Opinion of Mr Advocate General Le´ger delivered on 22 November 1994 in Case C-279/93
Schumacker para. 53
77Opinion of Mr Advocate General Le´ger delivered on 22 November 1994 in Case C-279/93
Schumacker paras. 38-71.
78Opinion of Mr Advocate General Le´ger delivered on 22 November 1994 in Case C-279/93
Schumacker paras. 91-96.
79See for example Michael Lang, “Recent Case Law of the ECJ in Direct Taxation: Trends,
Tensions and Contradictions”, EC tax review 3.2009 (2009): and the literature referred to
there.
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discrimination in this case could not be justified by the need for fiscal cohesion, it
was precluded by the freedom of establishment.80
4.2.2 C-107/94 Asscher - Higher Tax Rate for Non-Residents
After Wielockx came C-107/94 Asscher. As a non resident, Mr Asscher had to pay
higher tax at a higher rate than residents earning income from the same economic
activity in the Netherlands. While residents were taxed at a rate of 13% even
if they received less than 90% of their worldwide income, non residents had to
meet than threshold; otherwise the applicable tax rate was 25%.81 Mr Asscher had
moved to Belgium from the Netherlands where he received remuneration from his
company, and due to the tax treaty that income was only taxable in that country.
In Belgium, that income was exempt but taken into account for determining the
progressive tax rate.82 Thus, the difference in treatment in the Netherlands could
not be explained by the fact that a non resident escaped the progressiveness of the
tax in there, since Belgium had the right to take into account the worldwide income
when determining the progressive tax rate.83 Consequently, the ECJ concluded
that resident and non-residents wee comparable with regard to that rule.84
4.2.3 C-336/96 Gilly - Right to Tax, Obligation to Make Available Benefits
In C-336/96 Gilly the ECJ established that when countries have allocated the
powers of taxation using nationality as a connecting factor, and all income of a
taxpayer is derived in the source state, that state is not obliged to take into account
personal and family circumstances, if the residence state has been given the right
to tax the total income of the taxpayer and therefore also grants the available tax
advantages and deductions in that state.85
4.2.4 C-391/97 Gschwind - Threshold for Joint Taxation
The threshold applicable for non-residents, that 90% of a couples total income had
to be derived in Germany in order for the joint taxation to apply, was questioned
in Case C-391/97 Gschwind.86 The circumstances in the case was that over 40%
of the household’s income was earned in the state of residence, and in any case
where that income exceeded 10% the ECJ concluded that the legislation at issue
maintained the possibility for the personal and family circumstances to be taken
80C-80/94 G. H. E. J. Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen [1995].
81C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [1996] para. 45.
82C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [1996] para.15.
83C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [1996] paras. 47-48.
84C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [1996] para. 45.
85C-336/96 Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin [1998].
86C-391/97 Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt [1999] para. 14.
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into account in the state of residence and thus was compatible with the freedom
of movement for workers.87
4.2.5 C-87/99 Zurstrassen - Residence Requirement for Joint Taxation
Also in Case C-87/99 Zurstrassen conditions for applying joint taxation for a
couple was questioned in relation to the freedom of movement for workers .The
ECJ stated that such tax advantage can not be denied only because one of the
spouses is not resident in the state, in case the other (resident) spouse derives
almost all the income of the household in that state.88
4.2.6 C-385/00 de Groot - Apportionment for Allowances
In C-385/00 de Groot89 the Netherlands applied progression with exemption and
apportionment for allowances relating to the personal and family circumstances of
the taxpayer.90 The tax rules aimed to distribute personal allowances over the
worldwide income, and allowances were deducted proportionally from the tax
payable in Netherlands on the income from that state.91
De Groot, resident in the Netherlands, received income from the Netherlands and
several other Member States and was obliged to pay maintenance payments to the
woman he was no longer married to.92 In none of the source states his personal
and family circumstances were taken into account, while they were proportionally
taken into account in the residence state.93 The ECJ stated that the residence
state could be free from the obligation to fully take into account the personal and
family circumstances of a taxpayer in case the the source states take into account
his ability to pay.94 However, as this was not the case, the legislation created an
obstacle to the free movement of worker and was precluded.95
4.2.7 C-234/01 Gerritse - Flat Taxation and Allowance
Application of a flat tax rate for non-residents without allowing deduction of a
basic allowance, whereas residents was granted the allowance and were taxed at
a progressive scale, was questioned in Case C-234/01 Gerritse. The ECJ held
that where the non-resident also is subject to progressive taxation in his state
of residence, he is in a comparable situation to a resident of the host state. In
87C-391/97 Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt [1999] paras 29, 32.
88C-87/99 Patrick Zurstrassen v Administration des contributions directes [2000] para.27.
89C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002].
90C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002] paras. 21, 25.
91C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002] para. 26.
92C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002] paras. 29,30.
93C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002] para. 47.
94C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002] para. 100.
95C-385/00 F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2002] para. 100.
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case a flat taxation leads to a higher tax payable for the non-resident taxpayer,
the legislation constitutes discrimination.96 97 As regards the basic allowance the
ECJ held that “[...]it has a social purpose, allowing the taxpayer to be granted an
essential minimum exempt from all income tax[...].”98
4.2.8 C-169/03 Wallentin - Basic Allowance
Again in Case C-169/03 Wallentin the denial of deduction of a basic allowance for
non-residents was questioned. The ECJ held that in cases where the non-resident
taxpayer receives no significant taxable income in his state of residence, denial of
a basic allowance constitutes discrimination.99 The same reasoning applies where
the taxable payment is a retirement pension, as established in Case C-520/04
Turpeinen.100
4.2.9 C-182/06 Lakebrink - Deduction of Negative Rental Income
Legislation allowing only for resident taxpayers to take into account negative rental
income relating to a house when determining the applicable tax rate constitutes
discrimination in case the non-resident taxpayer receives almost all of his income in
the source state.101 The ECJ held in Lakebrink that “[...]the ability to pay tax may
indeed be regarded as forming part of the personal situation of the non-resident
within the meaning of the judgment in Schumacker.102 The same reasoning was
applied in Case C-527/06 Renneberg.103
96C-234/01 Arnoud Gerritse v Finanzamt Neuko¨lln-Nord [2003] para. 53.
97Interestingly, the calculation when applying the progressive scale in this case resulted in a
higher tax!, see para. 54.
98C-234/01 Arnoud Gerritse v Finanzamt Neuko¨lln-Nord [2003] para. 48.
99C-169/03 Florian W. Wallentin v Riksskatteverket [2004] para. 24.
100C-520/04 Pirkko Marjatta Turpeinen [2006] para. 39.
101C-182/06 E´tat du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Hans Ulrich Lakebrink and Katrin Peters-
Lakebrink [2007] paras. 30, 35.
102C-182/06 E´tat du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Hans Ulrich Lakebrink and Katrin Peters-
Lakebrink [2007] para. 34.
103C-527/06 R. H. H. Renneberg v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2008] paras. 61 and 84.
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5 The Scope of the Schumacker Doctrine in Recent
Case Law
5.1 C-39/10 Comm. v Estonia - Allowance on Retirement
Pensions
The Estonian income tax law granted non-resident taxpayers allowances on pen-
sions in case their income from Estonia exceeded 75% of the worldwide income.104 A
person resident in Estonia received pension from both Estonia and Finland of equal
amounts. The total amount of income was so low that there was no liability to tax
in Finland and in Estonia it was slightly above the allowance threshold.105
The Commission was of the opinion that The Estonian tax law placed taxpayers
having received less than 75% of the total income in Estonia in a less favourable
situation because they had exercised their right of freedom of movement of work-
ers.106 The Republic of Estonia held that this category of taxpayers was not in a
comparable situation to that of a person who reached that threshold.107
The ECJ referred to previous case law and stated that discrimination can arise
between residents and non-residents only in case they are in a comparable situa-
tion. That would be the case when the non-resident receives no significant taxable
income in the residence state because that state would in such situation not be
in position to take into account the personal and family circumstances of the tax-
payer.108
Even though the residence state in principle should be able to take into account
the personal and family circumstances of the taxpayer in a case where he receives
more than 50% of his total income in that state, this was not the case at hand. The
circumstances was that the taxpayer had no taxable amount in the residence state
which could therefore not take into account the personal and family circumstances
of the taxpayer.109
Thus the ECJ concluded that the tax legislation at issue created an obstacle to
the free movement of workers that could not be justified.’110
5.2 C-425/11 Ettwein - Splitting Regime
Case C-425/11 Ettwein from February 2013 concerned, as in the Schumacker case,
denial of the splitting regime for non resident tax payers. The self-employed work-
104C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012] para. 35.
105C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012] para. 15.
106C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012] para. 32.
107C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012] para. 40.
108C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012] paras. 51-53.
109C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012] paras. 54-55.
110C-39/10 European Commission v Republic of Estonia [2012] para. 68.
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ers, Mr and Mrs Ettwein, were of German nationality, lived in Switzerland, but
derived all their income from Germany. German tax law required, for applicability
of the splitting regime, that the tax payers had their residence within the territory
of a Member State in the European Union or in an EEA state. However, the
agreement between the European Member States and Switzerland granted no less
favourable treatment for self-employed persons in the host state than the benefits
applied for it’s own nationals. Thus, the treaty conferred to Mr and Mrs Ettwein
the same tax advantages as applied to nationals in Germany.111
The Advocate General Ja¨a¨skinen argued that discrimination on the ground of na-
tionality could not be the case, as Mr. and Mrs. Ettwein were German nationals.
Hence, since there was no such discrimination in the context of the EU, the cor-
responding rules in the EC-Switzerland agreement could not be applied.112 Thus
the Schumacker doctrine was not considered relevant and Ja¨a¨skinen concluded
that the Agreement did not preclude the denial of split taxation in German for
Mr and Mrs Ettwein.113
Contrary to the AG’s opinion, the Court examined the situation of Mr and Mrs
Ettwein in the light of the ECJ case law, namely Schumacker and Asscher, and
stated that even though the residence state usually has the best possibility to take
into account the tax payer’s ability to pay, the situation is different in case this
state cannot do so because the tax payer derives all or almost all of his income
from the source state.114 The ECJ concluded that a non-resident pursuing business
activity in the source state and earns all or almost all of his income there is in a
comparable situation to that of a resident pursuing the same activity there. Thus,
personal and family circumstances would in this case have to be taken into account
by the source state. The free movement of persons established in the agreement
thus precluded the denial of the splitting regime in Germany for Mr and Mrs
Ettwein.115
As O’Shea has pointed out, the ECJ applied the Schumacker doctrine in the Et-
twein case when determining the comparability of residents and non residents in
situations regarding personal tax benefits. Further, the Court confirmed previous
case law establishing the national treatment principle applicable in both a host
and an origin member state. In this case, Germany was considered the host state
and at the same time the origin state, to which the German nationals Mr and Mrs
Ettwein could claim to benefit from the national treatment principle.116
111C-425/11 Katja Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz [2013] paras. 22-27.
112Opinion of Advocate General Ja¨a¨skinen delivered on 18 October 2013 in Case C-425/11 Katja
Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz para. 35.
113Opinion of Advocate General Ja¨a¨skinen delivered on 18 October 2013 in Case C-425/11 Katja
Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz paras. 54 and 68.
114C-425/11 Katja Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz [2013] para. 27.
115C-425/11 Katja Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz [2013] paras. 47-53.
116Tom O’Sheal, “ECJ Determines Applicability of German Tax Advantages for Swiss Residents”,
Tax Notes International 72 (2013): p. 259.
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5.3 C-181/12 Welte - Allowance for Calculation of Inheritance
Tax
In Welte the question was whether the free movement of capital precluded legisla-
tion in a Member State providing less allowance for the calculation of inheritance
tax in case both the deceased and the heir, at the time of the death, were resident
in a third country.117
Mr Welte, resident and a national of Switzerland, was his wife’s sole heir and had
inherited real estate located in Germany with a value of EUR 329 200 compromis-
ing 60% of the value of the total inheritance. The applicable amount of allowance,
calculated against the value of the real estate, was determined by the tax author-
ity to be EUR 2000. The inheritance tax for non residents was payable only on
immovable property but not on bank receivables. Had Mr Welte or his wife been
resident in Germany, the applicable allowance would have been EUR 500 000 and
he would not have to pay any tax.118
The Court referred to the ECJ in order to seek clarification on whether the different
treatment of residents and non residents as regards the amount of allowance appli-
cable for the calculation of inheritance tax was compatible with the free movement
of capital.
AG Mengozzi examined the compatibility of the legislation on inheritance tax
with the free movement of capital which precludes restrictions that are likely to
deter non residents from investing in a Member State and rules with the effect
of reducing the value of inheritance. Since the effect of the German inheritance
tax was that non residents were taxed more heavily than residents, that could
deter them from investing in the Member State. Thus the AG concluded that the
legislation resulted in a restriction on the movement of capital.119
If the restriction is a result of different treatment to persons who are not objec-
tively comparable, it can be accepted under EU law. The Belgian and the German
Government argued than residents and non residents in this case were not objec-
tively comparable, since in this case Germany only had limited tax powers, an
argument that had been rejected by the ECJ in previous case law. The reason
therefore was the that Member State normally apply identical tax for residents
and non residents and the residency of the taxpayer is in such case no justification
for denying a tax advantage such as an allowance. Also in those previous cases the
Member States only had powers to tax immovable property located within their
jurisdiction.120
117C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] para. 17.
118Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert paras. 3-9.
119Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert paras. 28-30.
120Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert para.31-33
21
Mengozzi proceeded and stated that even if the ECJ would conclude that residents
and non-residents are generally not comparable, as established in the Schumacker
case, the state in which the immovable property was situated was the only state
that had the possibility to take into account the taxpayers personal and family
circumstances. AG Mengozzi meant that since that part of the inheritance was
only taxable in the source state, the residence state had no possibility to take into
account the ability to pay.121
In a case similar to Welte, but where the value only consisted of immovable prop-
erty, the ECJ had held that if heirs of deceased persons who were resident and and
heirs of persons who were non-resident were put on the same footing as regards
taxing the immovable property, the law has established that there was no objective
difference between them. Since there was no objective difference between those
taxpayers, different treatment as regards the deductibility of debts relating to that
property would constitute discrimination.122
As regards one of the possible justifications for the restriction, maintenance of fis-
cal cohesion, AG Mengozzi rejected the argument that a lower basis of assessment
could be set of by a lower allowance, because in a transfer of a single asset limited
and unlimited taxation are not apparently different. Furthermore, AG Mengozzi
stated emphasized that the allowance granted to German residents was not con-
nected to the value of the real estate, thus the direct link was missing.123
Neither could the need to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision be considered
valid as justification for the restriction, and thus AG Mengozzi found the legislation
at issue to be precluded by the free movement of capital.124
The ECJ came to the same conclusion as AG Mengozzi. It is interesting to note
that the Court concluded that the basis of assessment for tax on inheritance in
principle was less for a non resident than for a resident. However, the Court
put emphasis on the fact that the German tax legislation placed non-resident and
resident heirs on the same footing for the purposes of taxing immovable property,
thus the legislation accepted that there was no objective difference between those
two.125
In contrary to what had been held in the cases Shumacker 126 and Ettwein127 the
Court in this case did not require that the non resident was taxed on all or almost
all of his income in the source state in order to be considered comparable to a
resident. Although the real estate of the inheritance comprised no more than 60%
121Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert para. 39
122C-43/07 D. M. M. A. Arens-Sikken v Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n [2008] para. 57.
123Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert para.71.
124Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert para.73 and 86.
125C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] para.70-72.
126C-279/93 Finanzamt Ko¨ln-Altstadt v. Schumacker [1995] paras. 36 and 37.
127C-425/11 Katja Ettwein v Finanzamt Konstanz [2013] paras.46 and 47.
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of the value of the total inheritance, the relevance in Welte was put on the fact
that the legislation put residents and non residents on the same footing for taxing
immovable property.128
5.4 C-303/12 Imfeld - Allowance for Dependent Children
In Imfeld the question was whether the income tax law having the effect of making
unavailable the some personal tax benefits to a resident couple in case one of them
derives all of his income in another Member State is compatible with EU law. The
question was further what impact it may have that this person benefits partly from
the equivalent tax advantage in the source state.129
Mr. Imfeld, practising as a self employed lawyer in Germany, and his wife Ms
Garcet were resident in Belgium and had two children.130 The larger part of the
household’s income was earned by Mr Imfeld and taxable only in Germany due
to the applicable tax treaty. Even when taxable only in Germany, the income of
Mr Imfeld was taken into account for calculation of the payable Belgian tax at a
progressive rate and the applicable tax deductions.131
The problem was that the “supplementary allowance for dependent children” was
to be set against the highest income earned by one of the spouses. Since Mr Imfeld
earned the highest income on which the allowance was calculated, and the income
was not taxable in Belgium, the result was that the couple could not effectively
benefit from the deduction. However, Mr Imfeld was taxed separately in Germany
where he did receive an allowance for dependent children.132
The question to be examined was if the Belgian tax law was compatible with
the freedom of establishment. The AG observed that, according to settled case
law, the allowances relating to personal and family circumstances is in principle
to be taken into account by the residence state which can normally assess the
ability to pay. Only in case the taxpayer derives no significant income in the
residence state, the source state is required to take into account personal and
family circumstances.133
The “supplementary allowance for dependent children” was granted for Mr Im-
feld and Ms Garcet as a couple. However, since the allowance was set against
the income of Mr Imfeld that was not taxable in Belgium and deducted from the
128C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] paras 70-72.
129Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge paras. 1-2
130Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge para. 9.
131Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge para. 40.
132Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge paras. 41-42.
133Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge paras. 59-60.
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taxable amount, the couple could not benefit from the allowance. The AG con-
cluded that this result was a real disadvantage for the couple, as they would have
been able to benefit from the allowance had they received all their income, or the
major part of their income, in Belgium. The difference in tax treatment was ac-
cording to AG Villalo´n, likely to discourage citizens from excising the freedom of
establishment.134
The reason for setting of the allowance to the higher of the couple’s income was
to maximise the effect of the tax advantage, but in this cross-border situation the
effect was the opposite. AG Villalo´n stated that the obstacle to the freedom of
establishment was not “an inevitable consequence of the disparity of the national
legislations”, contrary to what the Belgian Government had argued.135 AG Villalo´n
further dismissed the argument that the Belgium would be free from its obligations
since Mr Imfelds personal and family circumstances were taken into account in
Germany: “a Member State cannot rely on the existence of an advantage granted
unilaterally by another Member State’.’136
As AG Villalo´n pointed out, the reason why Mr Imfeld and Ms Garcet were denied
the tax benefit was not because Mr Imfeld was granted the equivalent benefit in
Germany; there was no correlation in this regard. Thus, the freedom of establish-
ment precluded the Belgian tax legislation in question.137
The ECJ came to the same conclusion as the AG but emphasised that the re-
striction of the freedom of establishment in this case was a consequence of the
disadvantageous treatment of Ms Garcet’s income, fully subject to Belgian tax,
without her being able to benefit from the tax advantage.138
A problem that can arise is how to distinguish tax advantages such as the allowance
for dependent children from social security benefits. This has been pointed out by
Bruno Peters as he analyses the Imfeld case in relation to the Lachheb139 case in
in which a tax rebate for children was classified a social security benefit. Social
security rights are governed by EU regulations establishing that such rights shall
not be conferred to persons on the basis of their residency. Generally it is the state
in which a person works that has the obligation of making available social security
benefits. In the case Lachheb the ECJ classified the advantage as a social security
benefit because the granting of that benefit had no relation the income earned or
tax to be paid by the person.140
134Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge paras. 65-67.
135Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge para. 71
136Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge para. 76
137Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalo´n delivered on 13 June 2013 in Case C-303/12 Guido
Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge para. 86 and 89.
138C-303/12 Guido Imfeld, Nathalie Garcet v E´tat belge [2013] paras 76 and 81.
139C-177/12 Caisse nationale des prestations familiales v. Salim and Nadia Lachheb. [2013].
140Bruno Peeters, “Mobility of EU Citizens and Family Taxation: A Hard to Reconcile Combi-
nation”, EC Tax Review 23.3 (2014): pp. 119-120.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
The aim with this thesis is to seek clarification on what type of tax rules that
are considered as taking into account the taxpayer’s ability to pay/his personal
and family circumstances. The thesis also aim to clarify the applicable thresholds
determining when a taxpayer is in a Schumacker situation. These factors determine
the scope of the Schumacker doctrine.
6.1 Which Tax Rules Take Into Account the Taxpayer’s
Personal and Family Circumstances?
Tax rules taking into account the personal and family circumstances of a taxpayer
vary among the Member States in their character and function.141 From Lakebrink
we know that “[...]the ability to pay tax may indeed be regarded as forming part
of the personal situation of the non-resident within the meaning of the judgment
in Schumacker.142
As Mattson observes the ECJ considers a basic allowance a tax benefit relating to
the personal and family circumstances of the taxpayer, he points out that there
are considerable differences between countries regarding the size and function of
allowances. As he explains, the allowance in one country may have the function of
being equal to an amount that should be available for basic consumption, whereas
in another country it serves the purpose of relieving a taxpayer with incidental
income of administrative filing burdens. Mattson therefore argues that it is prob-
lematic to categorise basic allowances as benefits related to personal and family
circumstances.143 As shown in section 4.2, benefits allowing for deduction of pen-
sion reserves, joint taxation for couples and allowances are included in the tax
rules for which the Schumacker doctrine applies.
In C-425/11 Ettwein the taxpayers income was exclusively derived in the source
state, Germany. As they were also German nationals, the AG found that the
non-discrimination principle on the grounds of nationality could not be applies.
The ECJ however established in this case that also nationals of a Member State,
resident in another Member State, are protected from discrimination in the first
state. When they are in a comparable situation to residents in that state, it is re-
sponsible for taking into account personal and family circumstances. In this case,
the tax rule at issue was the splitting regime. Thus, the ECJ applied the Schu-
macker doctrine as regards comparability of residents and non-residents doctrine
141Nils Mattsson, “Does the European Court of Justice Understand the Policy behind Tax benefits
Based on Personal and Family circumstances?”, European Taxation-Amsterdam- 43.6 (2003):
p. 186.
142See section 4.2.9.
143Nils Mattsson, “Does the European Court of Justice Understand the Policy behind Tax benefits
Based on Personal and Family circumstances?”, European Taxation-Amsterdam- 43.6 (2003):
p. 193.
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and stated that the denial of the splitting regime in this case was a restriction of
the free movement of persons.144
In case C-181/12 Welte however, the taxpayer did not receive all or almost all of
the value of inheritance from the source state; it constituted approximately 60%
of the total value.145 Mr Welte was denied the higher amount of tax free allowance
and the Belgian Government argued that the legislation at issue was in line with
the Schumacker doctrine. According to the Goverment residents and non-resident
taxpayers were in objectively different situations because the latter were only taxed
on their domestic part of the assets, whereas residents were subject to unlimited
taxation.146 Furthermore, since Mr Welte only received part of the inheritance
from the source state, the Goverment argued that the residence state in principle
had the obligation to make available tax-free allowances in view of the taxpayer’s
personal personal situation”.147
According to the above reasoning, even though Welte was only subject to limited
taxation on the inheritance and the taxable in Germany value only constituted part
of the inheritance, Weltes situation was by the ECJ considered to be comparable
to a heir of a deceased person who had been resident in Germany.148
The reason for this was that the German legislation placed non-residents and res-
idents on the same footing for determination of the inheritance tax on immovable
property, whereas the amount of allowance was only dependent on the heir’s ca-
pacity as a taxable person but not the value of the property.149
Thus, while the Government argued that Mr. Welte was not in a comparable
situation ECJ did not accept this argument because the law put residents and
non-residents on the same footing for the purpose of taxing immovable prop-
erty. Clearly there was no objective difference between residents and non resi-
dents, irrespective of the ratio of the value of inheritance derived from the source
state.150
The reasoning applied in Welte goes back to Avoir Fiscal in which tax rules placed
companies with registered offices in the jurisdiction and branches with registered
offices outside the jurisdiction on the same footing for profit taxation. Where per-
sons are placed on the same footing, different treatment as regards tax advantages
constitutes discrimination.151
The Schumacker doctrine did not apply in Welte. If it had applied, Mr. Welte
would not have been comparable to a resident, since he did not derive most of
his income from the source state. There must be a difference between the tax
144See section 5.2.
145C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] para. 15.
146C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] 45-46.
147C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] para. 46.
148C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] para. 56.
149C-181/12 Yvon Welte v Finanzamt Velbert [2013] para. 51-55.
150See section 5.3.
151270/83 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1986] para. 20.
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rule granting the allowance for calculation of the inheritance tax on immovable
property and tax rules that are considered as taking into account the taxpayer’s
ability to pay that can explain why the Schumacker doctrine was not applied.
What is the difference between the allowance in Welte and tax rules taking into
account personal and family circumstances of a taxpayer? In order to answer
that question the characteristics of tax rules taking into account the ability to pay
must be identified. As has been said in section 3.2 Wattel explains that “[p]ersonal
allowances and non-income-related deductions weigh unspecified on a taxpayer’s
total income”152. This was the case also in de Groot and was used as an argument
for allocating them proportionally.153 In Welte the allowance was related to a
specific type of income. However, it is worth noting that AG Mengozzi was of the
opinion that if the case would fall within the scope of the Schumacker doctrine, the
source state would be the only state having the possibility of taking into account
personal and family circumstances, since the real estate was not taxable in the
residence state.154
Further, there was no direct link between the allowance and the tax levied on the
real estate, as AG Mengozzi pointed out.155 That is, the allowance did not vary,
but constituted a fixed amount irrespective of the tax on the real estate. This
amount was considerably higher if neither the heir was resident nor the deceased
had been resident in Germany. Indeed, there is normally such a link between
personal allowances and taxation of income in the residence state, since residents
are taxed progressively, see section 2.1.
From the reasoning above, one can draw the conclusion that deductions and al-
lowances taking into account the ability to pay are not attributable to specific
sources of income, as the case was in Wetle, since only the total income of a tax-
payers gives information about the ability to pay. This is in line with the approach
taken by Wattel but contrary to the opinion of Vanistendael who has held that
inheritance tax can take into account the ability to pay. Furthermore, from the
Welte case one can conclude that the residency of a taxpayer does not motivate
different treatment (even if they are in principle not comparable) in cases when
the tax legislation put them on the same footing.
The case Imfeld concerned the granting of a “supplementary allowance for de-
pendent children” to a couple resident in Belgium. The couple were in principle
granted this allowance, but in practice they could not benefit from the tax ad-
vantage due to the fact that one of the spouse’s income that this allowance was
calculated on was not taxable in the residence state. That spouse however, was
152Peter J Wattel, “Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal
Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice”, European Taxation
217 (2000): p. 227-228.
153See section 4.2.6
154Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert para. 39
155Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 12 June 2013 in Case C-181/12 Yvon
Welte v Finanzamt Velbert para.71.
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granted a similar advantage in the source state. First, one can conclude that
the ECJ considers the real outcome when examining whether a taxpayer suffers
a disadvantage. Secondly, one can conclude that the residence state cannot be
free from it’s obligation because a similar advantage is granted unilaterally by
the source state. The problem remains though how to distinguish between tax
advantages and social security advantages, which is very important as it is the
state in which a person works that is responsible for granting the latter type of
advantage, as opposed to personal tax advantages which is mainly the residence
state’s responsibility.
6.2 What is the Threshold for Applying the Schumacker
Doctrine?
Concerning rules that take into account personal and family circumstances of the
taxpayer, it has been established by the Schumacker doctrine that 1) it is in prin-
ciple the residence state that has the responsibility to take into account personal
and family circumstances for tax purposes, 2) only when the tax payer does not
derive sufficient income in the residence state in order to take into account per-
sonal and family circumstances, the source state is required to do so. The second
situation occurs when the taxpayer derives all or almost all of her income in the
source state.156
When the taxpayer derives income from various member states not taking into
account her personal and family circumstances, the residence state cannot be free
from the obligation to fully grant advantages taking into account the taxpayer’s
ability to pay.157 From the de Groot case one can conclude that the result in a
cross-border situation is required to be that the taxpayer has his ability to pay
taken into account completely and not only partially.
It was established in Gschwind that EU law does not preclude legislation setting
the threshold of 90% of the total income to be earned in the source state for
allowing joint taxation for non-resident couples. However, such legislation is only
permitted in case the taxpayer maintains the possibility of having her personal
and family situation taken into account by the residence state. Thus, the ECJ has
established that there is a requirement to be fulfilled when the source state applies
a threshold.
Furthermore, it follows from the case Commission v Estonia that even if the tax-
payer earns 50% his income in the residence state, the source state cannot always
refuse to grant tax advantages linked to the taxpayer’s personal and family cir-
cumstances. It may be the case that the only taxable income is earned in the
source state, which in such case must take into account the personal and family
circumstances of the taxpayer. Thus, it is not possible to set a threshold estab-
lishing that a certain percentage of income earned in the source state makes a
156See section 4.
157See section 4.2.6.
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non-resident comparable to a resident and gives the right to tax advantages taking
into account his ability to pay. The personal and family situation has to be taken
into account once somewhere.
One can conclude from the above reasoning that the ECJ enforces the principle of
ability to pay in in cases concerning the fundamental freedoms and aims to reach
the result that the taxpayer’s personal and family circumstances shall be fully
taken into account. In some cases, however, the taxpayer can get the advantage
of both a flat tax rate and personal tax advantages, as the case was in de Groot
and Wallentin. The question remains, to be answered by the ECJ in Hirvonen,
whether that problem can be solved with a system in which a taxpayer can choose
between being taxed as a resident and a non-resident.
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